Abstract. In this paper we present s e v eral weaknesses in the key scheduling algorithm of RC4, and describe their cryptanalytic signi cance. We identify a large number of weak keys, in which knowledge of a small number of key bits su ces to determine many state and output bits with non-negligible probability. We use these weak keys to construct new distinguishers for RC4, and to mount related key attacks with practical complexities. Finally, w e show that RC4 is completely insecure in a common mode of operation which is used in the widely deployed Wired Equivalent P r i v acy protocol (WEP, which is part of the 802.11 standard), in which a xed secret key is concatenated with known IV modi ers in order to encrypt di erent messages. Our new passive ciphertext-only attack on this mode can recover an arbitrarily long key in a negligible amount of time which grows only linearly with its size, both for 24 and 128 bit IV modi ers.
Introduction
RC4 is the most widely used stream cipher in software applications. It was designed by Ron Rivest in 1987 and kept as a trade secret until it leaked out in 1994. RC4 has a secret internal state which i s a p e r m utation of all the N = 2 n possible n bits words, along with two indices in it. In practical applications n = 8 , and thus RC4 has a huge state of log 2 (2 8 ! (2 8 ) 2 ) 1700 bits.
In this paper we analyze the Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA) which d e r i v es the initial state from a va r i a b l e s i z e k ey, and describe two signi cant w eaknesses of this process. The rst weakness is the existence of large classes of weak keys, in which a small part of the secret key determines a large number of bits of the initial permutation (KSA output). In addition, the Pseudo Random Generation Algorithm (PRGA) translates these patterns in the initial permutation into patterns in the pre x of the output stream, and thus RC4 has the undesirable property that for these weak keys its initial outputs are disproportionally a ected by a small number of key bits. These weak keys have length which is divisible by some non-trivial power of two, i.e.,`= 2 q m for some q > 0 1 . W h e n 1 Here and in the rest of the paper`is the numberof words of K, where each w ord contains n bits.
RC4 n uses such a w eak key of`words, xing n + q(`; 1) + 1 bits of K (as a particular pattern) determines (qN) bits of the initial permutation with probability of one half and determines various pre xes of the output stream with various probabilities (depending on their length).
The second weakness is a related key vulnerability, which applies when part of the key presented to the KSA is exposed to the attacker. It consists of the observation that when the same secret part of the key is used with numerous di erent exposed values, an attacker can rederive the secret part by analyzing the initial word of the keystreams with relatively little work. This concatenation of a long term secret part with an attacker visible part is a commonly used mode of RC4, and in particular it is used in the WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) protocol, which protects many wireless networks. Our new attack o n t h i s mode is practical for any k ey size and for any modi er size, including the 24 bit recommended in the original WEP and the 128 bit recommended in the revised version WEP2.
The paper is organized in the following way: In Section 2 we describe RC4 and previous results about its security. In Section 3 we consider a slightly modi ed variant of the Key Scheduling Algorithm, called KSA , and prove t h a t a particular pattern of a small numberofkey bits su ces to completely determine a large number of state bits. Afterwards, we s h o w that this weakness of KSA , which we denote as the invariance weakness, exists (in a weaker form) also in the original KSA. In Section 4 we s h o w that with high probability, the patterns of initial states associated with these weak keys also propagate into the rst few outputs, and thus a small numberofweak key bits determine a large number of bits in the output stream. In Section 5 we describe several cryptanalytic applications of the invariance weakness, including a new type of distinguisher. In Sections 6 and 7 we describe the second weakness, which we denote as the IV weakness, and show that a common method of using RC4 is vulnerable to a practical attack due to this weakness. In Section 8, we s h o w h o w both these weaknesses can separately be used in a related key attack. In the appendices, we examine how the IV weakness can be used to attack a real system (appendix A), how the invariance weakness can be used to construct a ciphertext-only distinguisher and to prove that RC4 has low sampling resistance (appendices B and C), and how to derive the secret key from an early permutation state (appendix D).
RC4 and Its Security 2.1 Description of RC4
exchange the two v alues of S pointed to by i and j, and output the value of S pointed to by S i] + S j] 2 . N o t e t h a t e v ery entry of S is swapped at least once (possibly with itself) within any N consecutive rounds, and thus the permutation S evolves fairly rapidly during the output generation process.
The KSA consists of N loops that are similar to the PRGA round operation. It initializes S to be the identity permutation and i and j to 0, and applies the PRGA round operation N times, stepping i across S, and updating j by adding S i] and the next word of the key (in cyclic order). We w i l l c a l l e a c h round of KSA a step. 
Previous Attacks on RC4
Due to the huge e ective k ey of RC4, attacking the PRGA seems to be infeasible (the best known attack on this part requires time that exceeds 2 700 ). The only practical results related to the PRGA deal with the construction of distinguishers. Fluhrer and McGrew described in FM00] how to distinguish RC4 outputs from random strings with 2 30 data. A better distinguisher which requires 2 8 data was described by Mantin and Shamir in MS01]. However, this distinguisher could only be used to mount a partial attack o n R C4 in broadcast applications.
The fact that the initialization of RC4 is very simple stimulated considerable research o n t h i s m e c hanism of RC4. In particular, Roos discovered in Roo95] a class of weak keys that reduces their e ective size by v e bits, and Grosul and Wallach s h o wed in GW00] that for large keys whose size is close to N words, RC4 is vulnerable to a related key attack.
More analysis of the security o f R C4 can be found in KMP + 98], Gol97] a n d MT98].
The Invariance Weakness
Due to space limitations we p r o ve here the invariance weakness only for a simpli ed variant of the KSA, which w e denote as KSA and describe in Figure 2 .
The only di erence between them is that KSA updates i at the beginning of the loop, whereas KSA updates i at the end of the loop. After formulating and proving the existence of this weakness in KSA , w e describe the modi cations required to apply this analysis to the real KSA. 
De nitions
De nition 1 Let S be a p ermutation of f0 : : : N ; 1g, t be an index in S and b be some integer. Then if S t] modb t, the permutation S is said to b-conserve the index t. Otherwise, the permutation S is said to b-unconserve the index t. Denote the permutation S and the indices i and j after round t of KSA as S t , i t and j t respectively. Denote the number of indices that a permutation b-conserves as I b (S). For the sake of simplicity, w e often write I t instead of I b (S t ).
3.2 The Weakness Theorem 1 Let q n and`be integers and b def = 2 q . Suppose that b j`and let K be a b-exact key of`words. Then the permutation S = K S A (K) is b-conserving.
Before getting to the proof itself, we w i l l p r o ve an auxiliary lemma Lemma 1 If i t+1 j t+1 (mod b), t h e n I t+1 = I t . Proof: The only operation that might a ect S (and maybe I) i s t h e s w apping operation. However, when i t+1 and j t+1 are equivalent (mod b), S t+1 b-conserves i t+1 (j t+1 ) if and only if S t b-conserved j t (i t ). Thus the number of indices S b-conserves remains the same. u t Proof:(of Theorem 1) We w i l l p r o ve b y induction on t that for any 1 t N, it turns out that I b (S t ) = N and i t j t (mod b). This in particular implies that I N = N, which makes the output permutation b-conserving.
For t = 0 (before the rst round), the claim is trivial because i 0 = j 0 = 0 and S 0 is the identity permutation which is b-conserving for every b. Suppose that j t i t and S t is b-conserving. Then i t+1 = i t + 1 a n d j t+1 = j t + S t i t+1 ] + K i t+1 mod`] modb i t + i t+1 + ( 1 ; i t+1 ) = i t + 1 = i t+1
Thus, i t+1 j t+1 (mod b) a n d b y applying Lemma 1 we g e t I t+1 = I t = N and therefore S t+1 is b-conserving. u t KSA thus transforms special patterns in the key into corresponding patterns in the initial permutation. The fraction of determined permutation bits is proportional to the fraction of xed key bits. For example, applying this result to RC4 n=8 `=6 and q = 1, 6 out of the 48 key bits completely determine 252 out of the 1684 permutation bits.
Adjustments to KSA
The small di erence between KSA and KSA (see when the probability is over the rest of the key bits.
Due to space limitations, the formal proof of this theorem (which is based on a detailed case analysis) will appear only in the full version of this paper. However, we can explain the intuition behind this theorem by concentrating on the di erences between Theorems 1 and 2, which deal with KSA and KSA respectively. During the rst round, two deviations from KSA execution occur. The rst one is the non-equivalence of i and j which is expected to cause non-equivalent e n tries to be swapped during the next rounds, thus ruining the delicate structure that was preserved so well during KSA execution. The second deviation is that S b-unconserves two of the indices, i 1 = 0 a n d j 1 = K 0]. However, we can cancel the ij discrepancy by forcing K 0] (and j 1 ) t o 1 . I n t h i s case, the discrepancy in S j 1 ] ( K 1]) causes an improper value to be added to j, t h us repairing its non-equivalence to i during the second round. At this point there are still two unconserved indices, and this aberration is dragged across the whole execution into the resulting permutation. Although these corrupted entries might i n terfere with j updates, the pseudo-random j might r e a c h t h e m before they are used to update j (i.e., before i reaches them), and send them into a region in S where they cannot a ect the next values of j 3 . The probability o f this lucky event is ampli ed by the fact that the corrupted entries are i 1 = 0 which is not touched until the termination of the KSA due to its distance from the current location of i, a n d j 2 = 1 + K 1] > N = 2 (recall that msb(K 1]) = 1), that is far from i 1 = 2 , which gives j many opportunities to reach i t before i does. The probability o f N=2 pseudo random j's to reach an arbitrary value can be bounded from below by 2/5, and extensive experimentation indicates that this probability is actually close to one half.
Key-Output Correlation
In this section we will analyze the propagation of the weak key patterns into the generated outputs. First we p r o ve Claim 1 which deals with the highly biased behavior of a weakened variant of the PRGA, applied to a b-conserving permutation. Next, we will argue that the pre x of the output of the original PRGA is highly correlated to the pre x of the swapless variant (on the same initial permutation), which implies the existence of biases in the PRGA distribution for these weak keys.
Claim 1 Let RC4 be a w e akened variant of RC4 with no swap operations. Let q n, b def = 2 q and S 0 be a b-conserving permutation. Let fX t g 1 t=1 be the output sequence generated by applying RC4 to S 0 , and x t def = X t mod b. Then the sequence fx t g 1 t=1 is constant.
Since there are no swap operation, the permutation does not change and re- Recall that at each step of the PRGA, S changes in at most two locations, and thus we can expect the pre x of the output stream generated by R C4 from some permutation S 0 , to be highly correlated with the stream generated from the same S 0 (or a slightly modi ed one) by R C4 . In particular the stream generated by RC4 from an almost b-conserving permutation is expected to be highly correlated with the constant substream fx t g from Claim 1. This correlation is demonstrated in Figure 8 , where the function h ;! P r 1 8 t h Z t x t mod 2 q ] (for special 2 q -exact keys) is empirically estimated for n = 8 , = 16 and di erent q's. For example, a special 2-exact key completely determines 20 output bits (the lsb's of the rst 20 outputs) with probability 2 ;4:2 instead of 2 ;20 , and a special 16-exact key completely determines 40 output bits (4 lsb's from each o f t h e r s t 10 outputs) with probability 2 ;2:3 , instead of 2 ;40 .
We h a ve t h us demonstrated a strong probabilistic correlation between some bits of the secret key and some bits of the output stream for a large class of weak keys. In the next section we describe how to use this correlation to cryptanalyze RC4.
Cryptanalytic Applications of the Invariance Weakness

Distinguishing RC4 Streams from Randomness
In MS01] Mantin and Shamir described a signi cant statistical bias in the second output word of RC4. They used this bias to construct an e cient algorithm which distinguishes between RC4 outputs and truly random sequences by a n alyzing only one word from O(N) di erent outputs streams. This is an extremely e cient distinguisher, but it can be easily avoided by discarding the rst two words from each output stream. If these two w ords are discarded, the best known distinguisher requires about 2 30 output words (see FM00]). Our new observation yields a signi cantly better distinguisher for most of the typical key sizes. The new distinguisher is based on the fact that for a signi cant fraction of keys, a signi cant n umber of initial output words contain an easily recognizable pattern. This bias is attened when the keys are chosen from a uniform distribution, but it does not completely disappear and can be used to construct an e cient distinguisher even when the rst two w ords of each output sequence are discarded.
Notice that the probability of a special 2 q -exact key to be transformed into a 2 q -conserving permutation, does not depend of the key length`(see Theorem 2). However, the number of predetermined bits is linear in`, and consequently the size of this bias (and thus the number of required outputs) also depends on`. I n Figure 5 we specify the quantity of data required for a reliable distinguisher, for di erent k ey sizes. In particular, for 64 bit keys the new distinguisher requires only 2 21 data instead of the previously best numberof2 30 output words.
It is important to notice that the speci ed output patterns extend over several dozen output words, and thus the quality of the distinguisher is almost una ected by discarding the rst few words. For example, discarding the rst two w ords causes the data required for the distinguisher to grow b y a factor of between 2 0:5 and 2 2 (depending on`). Another important observation is that the biases in the lsb's distribution can be combined in a natural way with the biased distribution of the lsb's of English texts into an e cient distinguisher of RC4 streams from randomness in a ciphertext-only attack i n w h i c h the attacker does not know t h e actual English plaintext which w as encrypted by R C4. This type of distinguishers is discussed in Appendix B.
RC4 has Low Sampling Resistance
Biryukov, Shamir and Wagner de ned in BSW00] a new security measure of stream ciphers, which they denoted as their Sampling Resistance. The strong correlation between classes of RC4 keys and corresponding output patterns can be used to prove that RC4 has relatively low sampling resistance, which i m p r o ves the e ciency of time/memory/data tradeo attacks. Further details can be found in Appendix C.
RC4 Key Setup and the First Word Output
In this section, we consider related key attacks where the attacker has access to the values of all the bits of certain words of the key. In particular, we consider the case where the key presented to the KSA is made up of a secret key concatenated with an attacker visible value (which w e will refer to as an Initialization Vector or IV ). We w i l l s h o w that if the same secret key is used with numerous di erent initialization vectors, and the attacker can obtain the rst word of RC4 output corresponding to each initialization vector, he can reconstruct the secret key with minimal e ort. How often he can do this, the amount of e ort and the number of initialization vectors required depends on the order of the concatenation, the size of the IV, and sometimes on the value of the secret key. This observation is especially interesting, as this mode of operation is used by s e v eral commercially deployed encryption systems ( Rei01] , LMSon]) and the rst word of plaintexts is often an easily guessed constant s u c h as the date, the sender's identity, etc, and thus the attack is practical even in a ciphertext-only mode of attack. However, the weakness does not extend to the Secure Socket Layer protocol that browsers use.
In terms of keystream output, this attack i s i n terested only in the rst word of output from any g i v en secret key and IV. Hence, we can simplify our model of the output. The rst output word depends only on three speci c permutation elements, as shown in the gure below showing the state of the permutation immediately after KSA. When those three words are as shown, the value labeled Z will be output as the rst word. , then (if we model the remaining swaps in the key setup as random) with probability greater than e ;3 0:05, none of the elements referenced by these three values will participate in any further swaps, and in that case, the value S S 1] + S S 1]]] will be output as the rst word. With probability less than 1 ; e ;3 0:95, at least one of the three values will participate in a swap, and be set to an e ectively random value, which will make the output value e ectively random. We will refer to this situation as the resolved condition. Our attack i n volves examining messages with speci c IV values such that, at some point, the KSA is in a resolved condition, and where First consider the case where the IV is prepended to the secret key. In this circumstance, assuming we h a ve a n I word IV, and a secret key ( t X] denotes the location within the permutation S t where the value X appears. This prediction is accurate more than 5% of the time, and e ectively random less than 95% of the time. By collecting su ciently many v alues from di erent I V s , w e can reconstruct K B]. The attacker knows the permutation S A+2 and the value of j A+2 . In addition, if he knows the value of S A+3 A + 3], he knows its location in S A+2 , w h i c h i s t h e value of j A+3 , and hence he would be able to compute K A + 3 ] . W e a l s o n o t e that i A+3 has now s w ept past 1, S A+3 1] and S A+3 1] + S A+3 S A+3 1]], and thus the resolved condition exists, and hence with probability p > 0:05, by examining the value of the rst word of RC4 output with this IV, the attacker will obtain the correct value of K A + 3]. Hence, by examining approximately 60 IVs with the above con guration, the attacker can rederive K A] with a probability of success greater than 0.5.
By iterating the above process across the secret key, the attacker can rederivè words of secret key using 60`chosen 3 word IVs.
The next thing to note is that the attack w orks for IVs other than those in the speci c (A + 3 N ; 1 X ) f o r m . Any I word IV that, after I steps, leaves S I 1] < I and S I 1] + S I S I 1]] = I + B will su ce for the above attack. In addition, since the attacker is able to simulate the rst I steps of the key setup, he is able to determine which I V s h a ve this property. By examining all IVs that have this property, w e can extend this into a known IV attack, without using an excessive number of IVs. The probabilities to nd the next word, and the expected number of IVs needed to obtain 60 IVs of the proper form, are given in Figure 6 at the end of this paper.
IV Follows the Secret Key
In the case that the IV is appended to the secret key, w e need to take a di erent approach. The previous analysis attacked individual key words. When the IV follows the secret key, what we do instead is select IVs that give us the state of the permutation at an early phase of the key setup, such as immediately after the secret key has been used for the rst time. Given that only a few swaps have occurred up to that point, it is reasonably straight-forward to reconstruct those swaps from the permutation state, and hence obtain the secret key (see Appendix D for one such method).
To illustrate the attack in the simplest case, suppose we have an A word secret key, a n d a 2 word IV. Further suppose that the secret key was weak in the sense that, immediately after A steps of KSA, S A 1] = X, X < A, and X + S A X] = A. This is a low probability event (p 0:00062 if A = 13), but it depends only on the secret key. F or such a w eak secret key, the attacker can assume the value of j A;1 + S Then, by assuming S A A + 1 ] (which with high probability is A + 1 , and will always be at most A + 1), we can examine IVs with the second word X = Y ; (1 + S A A + 1 ] ) , for an arbitrary Y , which will swap the value of S A Y ] into S A+1 A + 1]. Assuming Y isn't either 1 or A, t h e n the resolved condition have been set up, and using a numberofvalues for the third IV word Z, w e can deduce the value of S A+1 Y ] for an arbitrary Y , giving us the permutation after A steps.
There are a number of other types of weak keys that the attacker can take advantage of, summarized in Figure 7 found at the end of this paper.
The last weak secret key listed in Figure 7 is especially interesting, in that the technique that exposes the weakness is rather di erent than that of the other weak secret keys listed. Immediately after A steps, the state is: (again, this happens with high probability), the resolved condition has been achieved, and the rst output word will be biased towards S X+Z Y + const]. In addition, because the value of const will be the same independent o f Y , its value can easily be determined, thus allowing the attacker to observe m a n y o f the values of S X+Z . This class of weak keys requires far more known IVs to exploit, but also occurs relatively frequently.
If we have a 4 word 5 IV, then the same general approach as the previous analysis can be used to recover virtually all secret keys, given su cient IVs. First, we assume j A;1 , S A;1 A], S A;1 A+ 1 ] , S A;1 A+ 2 ] , S A;1 A+ 3 ] 6 . Then, based on this assumption, we search for IVs that, after A + 4 steps, sets S A+4 1] = X and S A+4 X] = Z for X Z <A+ 4 X + Z A + 4, and we note the value of j A+4 = Y . Then, we s a ve t h e v alue of X + Z, t h e v alue Y and the value output as the rst word for that particular IV. With nontrivial probability, t h e v alue of this word will be S X+Z Y +const X+Z ], where const X+Z is a constant term that depends on the secret key, a n d t h e v alue X + Z. Since that value is independent of the IV, we can collect numerous possible values of S X+Z Y + const X+Z ] f o r various values of X + Z, and use that to rst reconstruct const X+Z , and then reconstruct S X+Z .
8 Related-Key Attacks on RC4
In this section, we discuss two related-key attacks based on weaknesses discussed previously in this paper. They work within the following model: the attacker is given a black b o x that has a randomly chosen RC4 key K inside it, an output button and an input tape of jKj words. In each step the attacker can either press the output button to get the next output word, or write on the tape, which causes the black-box to restart the output generation process with a new key de ned as K 0 = K . The purpose of the attacker is to nd the key K (or some information about it).
5
This approach generalizes in the obvious way to longer IVs.
6
Note that SA;1 x] x for x A. This limits the size of the search required.
Related-Key Attack Based on the Invariance Weakness
This attack w orks when the numberofkey words, is a power of two. It consists of n stages where in stage q the q th bit of every key word is exposed 7 . The predicate CheckKey takes as input an RC4 blackbox and a parameter q (the stage number) and decides whether the key in the box is special 2 q -exact. This purpose can be achieved by randomly sampling key bits that are irrelevant f o r t h e 2 q -exactness of the key and estimating the expected length of q-patterned output. For a special 2 q -exact key the expected length will be signi cantly longer than in a random output (where it is less than 2) and thus CheckKey works in time O(1). The procedure Expand takes as input an RC4 blackbox and a parameter q (the stage number), assumes that the key in the box is special 2 q;1 -exact, and makes it special 2 q -exact. The method for doing so is by e n umerating all the possibilities for the q th bits (2`; 1 such possibilities) and invoking CheckKey to decide when the key in the box is special 2 q -exact. Expand works in a slightly di erent w ay for q = 1 a n d q = n. F or q = 1, except for the lsb's, it determines the complete K 0] (by forcing it to 1) and msb(K 1]). For q = n, there is only one 2 n -exact key and consequently we can calculate the output produced from this key and replace CheckKey by simple comparison. The time complexity of this stage is O(2 n+`) for q = 1 a n d O(2`; 1 ) f o r a n y other q. 
Related-Key Attack Based on Known IV Weakness
In this section we use the known IV weaknesses to develop an e cient related key attack o n R C4. The attack consists of 3 stages, where in the rst two stages we gain information on the rst three words of the secret key, and in the third stage we iterate down the key, and expose each w ord of the key successively. The stages of the attack are as follows:
Step 1 This step attempts to nd values of K 0], K 1] such that S 1 1] = 1, and reveal the value of K 2]. The procedure is to select random values of (X Y), and for each such random value, write onto the tape 240 vectors with the initial four words (X Y Z W) for Z 2 f0 N = 4 N = 2 3N=4g and with 60 distinct random values of W, and for each such vector, press the output button. If X and Y are such t h a t S 1 1] = 1 (for the modi ed key), then the output of the rst word will be biased towards 3+(K 2] Z), unless that value happens to be 1. Hence, for at least 3 of the selected values of Z, the rst word outputs will be biased towards one of const, const + N=4, const + N=2, const + 3 N=4. This is detectable, and also by examining the value of const, the attacker can reconstruct the value of K 2]. We expect to try N random values of (X Y) before nding a pair that is appropriate. In fact, K 1] is fully revealed during the rst stage (see Figure 4) Step 2 Step 3 This step iteratively recovers individual words of the key. It operates by running a subprocedure that assumes that we have already recovered S t e p 1 + S t e p 2 + ( ; 3) S t e p 3 = O(2 n+8 ) + 2 6 + ( ; 3)2 6 = O(2 n+8 )
For a RC4 key with n = 8 the time complexity is O(2 16 ) and is essentially independent of the key length.
Comparing the Attacks
Both attacks are able to completely reconstruct the randomly chosen RC4 key 8 with a number of chosen keys and amount of work that is signi cantly below that of brute force (except for extremely short RC4 keys). The rst attack scales upwards as the key grows longer, while the time complexity of the second attack is independent o f k ey length, with a cross-over point a t = 8 .
However, due to the second word weakness, future implementations of RC4 are likely to discard some pre x of the output stream, and in this case the second attack becomes di cult to apply { output word x depends on 2x+ 1p e r m utation elements immediately after KSA, and all the 2x + 1 elements must occur before t for the resolved condition to hold. On the other hand, the rst attack extends well, in that the probability of the output words being patterned drops modestly as the number of discarded words increases.
Discussion
Section 3 describes an interesting weakness of RC4 which results from the simplicity of its key scheduling algorithm. We recommend to neutralize this weakness by discarding the rst N words of each generated stream. After N rounds, every element of S is swapped at least once and the permutation S and the index j are expected to be "independent" of the initialization process.
Section 6 describes a weakness of RC4 in a common mode of operation in which attacker visible IV's are concatenated with a xed secret key. I t is easy to extend the attack to other simple types of combination operators (e.g., when we XOR the IV and the xed key) with essentially the same complexity. We recommend to neutralize this weakness by a voiding this mode of operation, or by using a secure hash to form the key presented to the KSA from the IV and secret key.
A Applying The Attack to WEP-like Cryptosystems
The Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol is designed to provide privacy to packet based wireless networks based on the 802.11 standard (see LMSon]). It encrypts by taking a secret key and a per-packet 3 byte IV, and using the IV followed by the secret key as the RC4 key. Then, it transmits the IV, and the RC4 encrypted payload. By using the results from Section 7.1, we can show how, by examining enough ciphertext packets, to reconstruct the secret key for a WEP-like cryptosystem. Note that we h a ve not attempted to attack an actual WEP connection, and hence do not claim that WEP is actually vulnerable to this attack.
We assume that the attacker is able to retrieve the rst byte of the RC4 output from each packet 9 . By the analysis done in section 7.1, to recover key byte B, the attacker needs to know the previous key bytes, and then search f o r IVs that sets up the permutation such t h a t X = S B+3 1] < B + 3
(1) X + S B+3 X] = B + 3
With 60 such IVs, the attacker can rederive the key byte with reasonable probability of success. The number of packets required to obtain that number of IVs depends on the exact IVs that the sender uses. Although the 802.11 standard does not specify how an implementation should generate these IVs, common practice is to use a counter to generate them.
A.1 Analysis of IVs Generated by a Little Endian Counter
If the IVs are generated by a m ultibyte counter in little endian order (and hence the rst byte of the IV increments the fastest), then the attacker can search f o r 
A.2 Analysis of IVs Generated by a Big Endian Counter
If the IVs are generated by a m ultibyte counter in big endian order (and hence the last byte of the IV increments the fastest), then the attacker can, as above, search for IVs of the form (B 255 N ). This requires approximately 1,000,000 packets to collect the requisite IVs, assuming that the counter starts from zero.
However, if the counter doesn't start from zero, the attacker has an alternative strategy available to him. He can assume the rst several bytes of secret key, and then search f o r IVs that set up the permutation as in Equation 1. If the attacker assumes the rst two b ytes of secret key, t h e n for each initial IV byte, there are approximately 4 settings of the remaining two bytes that set up the permutation as required to rederive a particular key byte. Hence, with approximately 1,000,000 packets, and an additional 2 16 work factor, he can still rederive the key.
It is common practice in the industry to extend the length of the WEP secret key (which is speci ed as 40 bit). Because the above attacks recover each key byte individually, the complexity of the attack grows linearly rather than exponentially with the key length, and thus even an extremely long key is not immune to this attack.
B Ciphertext-Only Distinguishers based on the Invariance Weakness
The distinguishers we presented in Section 5.1, as well as most of the distinguishers mentioned in the literature (for RC4 and other stream ciphers) assume knowledge of the plaintext in order to isolate the XORed key stream. However, in practice the only information the attacker has is typically some statistical knowledge about the plaintext, e.g., that it contains English text. Combining the non-random behaviors of the plaintext and the key-stream is not always possible, and there are cases where XORing biased streams result with a totally random stream, e.g. when one stream is biased in its even positions and the other stream is biased in its odd positions. We prove h e r e that if the plaintexts are English texts, it is easy to construct a ciphertext-only distinguisher from our biases. The intuition of this construction is that the biases described in Section 5.1 are in the distribution of the lsb's, and consequently they can be combined with the non-random distribution of the lsb's of English texts.
There are many major biases in the distribution of the lsb's of English texts, and they can be combined with biases of the key-stream words in various ways. In Theorem 3, we show h o w t o c o m bine the distribution of the rst lsb of the RC4 output stream, with the rst order statistics of English texts 10 :
Theorem 3 Let C be the ciphertext generated b y R C4 from a random key and the ASCII representation of plaintexts, distributed according to the rst order 10 Since the purpose of the theorem is only to demonstrate this approach , w e ignore the fact that the distribution of the rst characters in an English sentence di ers from the distribution of mid-text characters.
statistics of English texts. Let p be t h e p r obability of a random key to be s p ecial 2-exact. Then C can be distinguished f r om a random stream by analyzing about 200 p 2 output words.
For example, for RC4 n=8 with 8 b yte keys, p = 2 ;16 , which implies a reliable ciphertext-only distinguisher that works with less than 2 40 data. The proof of Theorem 3 is based on the observation that the lsb of a random English text character is zero with probability of about 55%. The formal proof is omitted due to space limitations.
It is important to note that Theorem 3 does not use all the statistical information which i s a vailable in either the key-stream or the plaintext distributions, and consequently does not represent the best possible attack.
C The Sampling Resistance of RC4
Most of the Time/Memory/Data tradeo attacks on stream ciphers are based on the following paradigm. The attacker keeps a database of state,output] pairs (sorted by output) and lookups every subsequence of the output stream in this database. When a (su ciently long) database sequence is located in the output, the attacker can conclude that the actual state is the one stored along with this sequence and predict the rest of the stream.
A drawback of this approach is that the large database must be stored in a hard disk(s) whose random access time is about a million times slower than a computational step. To i m p r o ve that attack w e can keep on disk only states that are guaranteed to produce outputs with some rare but easy recognizable property (e.g., starting with some pre x ). In this case only output sequences that have this property h a ve t o b e s e a r c hed in the database, and thus the expected time and the expected number of disk probes is signi cantly reduced.
In general, producing a pair state,output] with such a rare property costs much more than producing a random pair. O( 1 p ) random states are required to nd a single pair, where p is the probability of a random output to have this property. H o wever, if we can e ciently enumerate states that produce such outputs, the number of sampled states decreases dramatically, a n d this method can be applied without signi cant additional cost during the preprocessing stage. The sampling resistance of a stream cipher provides a lower bound on the e ciency of such e n umeration. Such a n a t t a c k can be applied to RC4 in two w ays, based on the KSA and PRGA parts. An attack o n t h e generation part constructs a database of pairs RC4 state, output substring] and analyzes all the substrings along a single output stream. The database construction is very simple since it is easy to enumerate states which produce outputs that have some constant pre x. However, this enumeration seems to be useless due to the huge e ective k ey of this part (1684 bits) which makes such a tradeo attack completely impractical. A more promising approach is based on the KSA part which uses a key of 40-256 bits and might b e vulnerable to tradeo attacks. In this case, the pairs in the database are secret key, pre x of the output stream], and the attack requires pre xes from a large number of streams (instead of a single long stream).
The correlation described in Section 4 provides an e cient sampling of keys that are more likely to produce output pre xes of the patterned type speci ed above (constant (mod b)).
For example, consider the problem of sampling M keys which are transformed by the KSA into streams whose rst ve w ords are xed (mod 16). This property of random streams has probability o f 2 ;20 , and the expected number of disk probes during the actual attack is reduced by this factor. For stream ciphers with high sampling resistance, such a lter would increase the preprocessing time by a factor of one million, as one would have t o s a m p l e a m i l l i o n random keys in order to nd a single \good" key. F or RC4 (due to the invariance weakness), the preprocessing time increases by a factor of less than four, as more than one quarter of the exact special keys produce such streams. Consequently, the preprocessing stage is accelerated by a factor of 2 18 .
To summarize this section, we p r o ved that RC4 has relatively low Sampling Resistance, w h i c h greatly improves the e ciency of tradeo attacks based on its KSA.
D Deriving the Secret Key from an Early Permutation State
Given permutation that distinguish them, the IV properties that the attacker searches for to reveal S Y ], the probability that this class of weak key will occur with n = 8 and a 16 word secret key, and the result of the attack o n t h e w eak key. 
